[v2] examples/ipsec-secgw: fix SPD no-match is misinterpreted

Message ID 20190404121326.23079-1-konstantin.ananyev@intel.com
State Accepted, archived
Delegated to: akhil goyal
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Series
  • [v2] examples/ipsec-secgw: fix SPD no-match is misinterpreted
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Context Check Description
ci/intel-Performance-Testing success Performance Testing PASS
ci/mellanox-Performance-Testing success Performance Testing PASS
ci/Intel-compilation success Compilation OK
ci/checkpatch success coding style OK

Commit Message

Ananyev, Konstantin April 4, 2019, 12:13 p.m.
acl_classify() returns zero value when no matching rule was found.
Currently ipsec-secgw treats it as a valid SPI value, though it has
to discard such packets.
Error could be easily observed by sending outbound unmatched packets,
user will see something like that in the log:
IPSEC: No cryptodev: core 7, cipher_algo 0, auth_algo 0, aead_algo 0

To fix it we need to treat packets with zero result from acl_classify()
as invalid ones. Also we can change DISCARD and BYPASS values to
simplify checks and save some extra space for valid SPI values.
To summarize the approach:
1. have special SPI values for DISCARD and BYPASS.
2. store in SPD full SPI value.
3. after acl_classify(), first check SPI value for DISCARD and BYPASS,
   then convert it in SA index.
4. add check at initilisation time that for each SPD rule there is a
   corresponding SA entry (with the same SPI).

Also marked few global variables as *static*.

Fixes: 906257e965b7 ("examples/ipsec-secgw: support IPv6")
Fixes: 2a5106af132b ("examples/ipsec-secgw: fix corner case for SPI value")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org

Signed-off-by: Konstantin Ananyev <konstantin.ananyev@intel.com>
---
 examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c | 20 ++++++------
 examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h       | 14 ++++++---
 examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c          | 35 ++++++++++++++++++---
 examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c         | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c         | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

Comments

Fan Zhang April 4, 2019, 6:39 p.m. | #1
> -----Original Message-----
> From: dev [mailto:dev-bounces@dpdk.org] On Behalf Of Konstantin
> Ananyev
> Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 1:13 PM
> To: dev@dpdk.org
> Cc: akhil.goyal@nxp.com; Ananyev, Konstantin
> <konstantin.ananyev@intel.com>; stable@dpdk.org
> Subject: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2] examples/ipsec-secgw: fix SPD no-match is
> misinterpreted

Acked-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
Akhil Goyal April 23, 2019, 12:58 p.m. | #2
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Zhang, Roy Fan <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
> Sent: Friday, April 5, 2019 12:10 AM
> To: Ananyev, Konstantin <konstantin.ananyev@intel.com>; dev@dpdk.org
> Cc: Akhil Goyal <akhil.goyal@nxp.com>; Ananyev, Konstantin
> <konstantin.ananyev@intel.com>; stable@dpdk.org
> Subject: RE: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2] examples/ipsec-secgw: fix SPD no-match is
> misinterpreted
> 
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: dev [mailto:dev-bounces@dpdk.org] On Behalf Of Konstantin
> > Ananyev
> > Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 1:13 PM
> > To: dev@dpdk.org
> > Cc: akhil.goyal@nxp.com; Ananyev, Konstantin
> > <konstantin.ananyev@intel.com>; stable@dpdk.org
> > Subject: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2] examples/ipsec-secgw: fix SPD no-match is
> > misinterpreted
> 
> Acked-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>

Acked-by: Akhil Goyal <akhil.goyal@nxp.com>

Applied to dpdk-next-crypto

Thanks.

Patch

diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c
index ffbd00b08..2e203393d 100644
--- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c
+++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c
@@ -438,11 +438,11 @@  inbound_sp_sa(struct sp_ctx *sp, struct sa_ctx *sa, struct traffic_type *ip,
 	for (i = 0; i < ip->num; i++) {
 		m = ip->pkts[i];
 		res = ip->res[i];
-		if (res & BYPASS) {
+		if (res == BYPASS) {
 			ip->pkts[j++] = m;
 			continue;
 		}
-		if (res & DISCARD) {
+		if (res == DISCARD) {
 			rte_pktmbuf_free(m);
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -453,9 +453,8 @@  inbound_sp_sa(struct sp_ctx *sp, struct sa_ctx *sa, struct traffic_type *ip,
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		sa_idx = ip->res[i] & PROTECT_MASK;
-		if (sa_idx >= IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES ||
-				!inbound_sa_check(sa, m, sa_idx)) {
+		sa_idx = SPI2IDX(res);
+		if (!inbound_sa_check(sa, m, sa_idx)) {
 			rte_pktmbuf_free(m);
 			continue;
 		}
@@ -541,16 +540,15 @@  outbound_sp(struct sp_ctx *sp, struct traffic_type *ip,
 	j = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < ip->num; i++) {
 		m = ip->pkts[i];
-		sa_idx = ip->res[i] & PROTECT_MASK;
-		if (ip->res[i] & DISCARD)
+		sa_idx = SPI2IDX(ip->res[i]);
+		if (ip->res[i] == DISCARD)
 			rte_pktmbuf_free(m);
-		else if (ip->res[i] & BYPASS)
+		else if (ip->res[i] == BYPASS)
 			ip->pkts[j++] = m;
-		else if (sa_idx < IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES) {
+		else {
 			ipsec->res[ipsec->num] = sa_idx;
 			ipsec->pkts[ipsec->num++] = m;
-		} else /* invalid SA idx */
-			rte_pktmbuf_free(m);
+		}
 	}
 	ip->num = j;
 }
diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h
index 99f49d65f..589398f6f 100644
--- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h
+++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h
@@ -41,10 +41,8 @@ 
 #define SPI2IDX(spi) (spi & (IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES - 1))
 #define INVALID_SPI (0)
 
-#define DISCARD (0x80000000)
-#define BYPASS (0x40000000)
-#define PROTECT_MASK (0x3fffffff)
-#define PROTECT(sa_idx) (SPI2IDX(sa_idx) & PROTECT_MASK) /* SA idx 30 bits */
+#define DISCARD	INVALID_SPI
+#define BYPASS	UINT32_MAX
 
 #define IPSEC_XFORM_MAX 2
 
@@ -289,6 +287,14 @@  sp4_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound);
 int
 sp6_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound);
 
+/*
+ * Search through SA entries for given SPI.
+ * Returns first entry index if found(greater or equal then zero),
+ * or -ENOENT otherwise.
+ */
+int
+sa_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound);
+
 void
 sa_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id);
 
diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c
index a7298a30c..b850e9839 100644
--- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c
+++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c
@@ -126,11 +126,11 @@  const struct supported_aead_algo aead_algos[] = {
 	}
 };
 
-struct ipsec_sa sa_out[IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES];
-uint32_t nb_sa_out;
+static struct ipsec_sa sa_out[IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES];
+static uint32_t nb_sa_out;
 
-struct ipsec_sa sa_in[IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES];
-uint32_t nb_sa_in;
+static struct ipsec_sa sa_in[IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES];
+static uint32_t nb_sa_in;
 
 static const struct supported_cipher_algo *
 find_match_cipher_algo(const char *cipher_keyword)
@@ -631,7 +631,7 @@  parse_sa_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens,
 	*ri = *ri + 1;
 }
 
-static inline void
+static void
 print_one_sa_rule(const struct ipsec_sa *sa, int inbound)
 {
 	uint32_t i;
@@ -1116,6 +1116,31 @@  ipsec_satbl_init(struct sa_ctx *ctx, const struct ipsec_sa *ent,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Walk through all SA rules to find an SA with given SPI
+ */
+int
+sa_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound)
+{
+	uint32_t i, num;
+	const struct ipsec_sa *sar;
+
+	if (inbound != 0) {
+		sar = sa_in;
+		num = nb_sa_in;
+	} else {
+		sar = sa_out;
+		num = nb_sa_out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i != num; i++) {
+		if (sar[i].spi == spi)
+			return i;
+	}
+
+	return -ENOENT;
+}
+
 void
 sa_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id)
 {
diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c
index d1dc64bad..ca9ee7f24 100644
--- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c
+++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@  parse_sp4_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens,
 
 	uint32_t *ri = NULL; /* rule index */
 	uint32_t ti = 0; /* token index */
+	uint32_t tv;
 
 	uint32_t esp_p = 0;
 	uint32_t protect_p = 0;
@@ -169,8 +170,12 @@  parse_sp4_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens,
 			if (status->status < 0)
 				return;
 
-			rule_ipv4->data.userdata =
-				PROTECT(atoi(tokens[ti]));
+			tv = atoi(tokens[ti]);
+			APP_CHECK(tv != DISCARD && tv != BYPASS, status,
+				"invalid SPI: %s", tokens[ti]);
+			if (status->status < 0)
+				return;
+			rule_ipv4->data.userdata = tv;
 
 			protect_p = 1;
 			continue;
@@ -472,6 +477,36 @@  acl4_init(const char *name, int32_t socketid, const struct acl4_rules *rules,
 	return ctx;
 }
 
+/*
+ * check that for each rule it's SPI has a correspondent entry in SAD
+ */
+static int
+check_spi_value(int inbound)
+{
+	uint32_t i, num, spi;
+	const struct acl4_rules *acr;
+
+	if (inbound != 0) {
+		acr = acl4_rules_in;
+		num = nb_acl4_rules_in;
+	} else {
+		acr = acl4_rules_out;
+		num = nb_acl4_rules_out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i != num; i++) {
+		spi = acr[i].data.userdata;
+		if (spi != DISCARD && spi != BYPASS &&
+				sa_spi_present(spi, inbound) < 0) {
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, IPSEC, "SPI %u is not present in SAD\n",
+				spi);
+			return -ENOENT;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void
 sp4_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id)
 {
@@ -488,6 +523,14 @@  sp4_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id)
 		rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Outbound SP DB for socket %u already "
 				"initialized\n", socket_id);
 
+	if (check_spi_value(1) < 0)
+		rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE,
+			"Inbound IPv4 SP DB has unmatched in SAD SPIs\n");
+
+	if (check_spi_value(0) < 0)
+		rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE,
+			"Outbound IPv4 SP DB has unmatched in SAD SPIs\n");
+
 	if (nb_acl4_rules_in > 0) {
 		name = "sp_ip4_in";
 		ctx->sp_ip4_in = (struct sp_ctx *)acl4_init(name,
@@ -523,7 +566,7 @@  sp4_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound)
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i != num; i++) {
-		if (acr[i].data.userdata == PROTECT(spi))
+		if (acr[i].data.userdata == spi)
 			return i;
 	}
 
diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c
index e67d85aaf..76be3d3e9 100644
--- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c
+++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@  parse_sp6_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens,
 
 	uint32_t *ri = NULL; /* rule index */
 	uint32_t ti = 0; /* token index */
+	uint32_t tv;
 
 	uint32_t esp_p = 0;
 	uint32_t protect_p = 0;
@@ -202,8 +203,12 @@  parse_sp6_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens,
 			if (status->status < 0)
 				return;
 
-			rule_ipv6->data.userdata =
-				PROTECT(atoi(tokens[ti]));
+			tv = atoi(tokens[ti]);
+			APP_CHECK(tv != DISCARD && tv != BYPASS, status,
+				"invalid SPI: %s", tokens[ti]);
+			if (status->status < 0)
+				return;
+			rule_ipv6->data.userdata = tv;
 
 			protect_p = 1;
 			continue;
@@ -586,6 +591,36 @@  acl6_init(const char *name, int32_t socketid, const struct acl6_rules *rules,
 	return ctx;
 }
 
+/*
+ * check that for each rule it's SPI has a correspondent entry in SAD
+ */
+static int
+check_spi_value(int inbound)
+{
+	uint32_t i, num, spi;
+	const struct acl6_rules *acr;
+
+	if (inbound != 0) {
+		acr = acl6_rules_in;
+		num = nb_acl6_rules_in;
+	} else {
+		acr = acl6_rules_out;
+		num = nb_acl6_rules_out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i != num; i++) {
+		spi = acr[i].data.userdata;
+		if (spi != DISCARD && spi != BYPASS &&
+				sa_spi_present(spi, inbound) < 0) {
+			RTE_LOG(ERR, IPSEC, "SPI %u is not present in SAD\n",
+				spi);
+			return -ENOENT;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void
 sp6_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id)
 {
@@ -602,6 +637,14 @@  sp6_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id)
 		rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Outbound IPv6 SP DB for socket %u "
 				"already initialized\n", socket_id);
 
+	if (check_spi_value(1) < 0)
+		rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE,
+			"Inbound IPv6 SP DB has unmatched in SAD SPIs\n");
+
+	if (check_spi_value(0) < 0)
+		rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE,
+			"Outbound IPv6 SP DB has unmatched in SAD SPIs\n");
+
 	if (nb_acl6_rules_in > 0) {
 		name = "sp_ip6_in";
 		ctx->sp_ip6_in = (struct sp_ctx *)acl6_init(name,
@@ -637,7 +680,7 @@  sp6_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound)
 	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i != num; i++) {
-		if (acr[i].data.userdata == PROTECT(spi))
+		if (acr[i].data.userdata == spi)
 			return i;
 	}