From patchwork Thu Apr 4 12:13:26 2019 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Patchwork-Submitter: "Ananyev, Konstantin" X-Patchwork-Id: 52297 X-Patchwork-Delegate: gakhil@marvell.com Return-Path: X-Original-To: patchwork@dpdk.org Delivered-To: patchwork@dpdk.org Received: from [92.243.14.124] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E4DF01B3D7; Thu, 4 Apr 2019 14:13:34 +0200 (CEST) Received: from mga11.intel.com (mga11.intel.com [192.55.52.93]) by dpdk.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8CEBB1B3B9; Thu, 4 Apr 2019 14:13:32 +0200 (CEST) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga001.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.18]) by fmsmga102.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 04 Apr 2019 05:13:31 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.60,308,1549958400"; d="scan'208";a="220502896" Received: from sivswdev08.ir.intel.com ([10.237.217.47]) by orsmga001.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 04 Apr 2019 05:13:29 -0700 From: Konstantin Ananyev To: dev@dpdk.org Cc: akhil.goyal@nxp.com, Konstantin Ananyev , stable@dpdk.org Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 13:13:26 +0100 Message-Id: <20190404121326.23079-1-konstantin.ananyev@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.18.0 In-Reply-To: <20190328124733.25580-1-konstantin.ananyev@intel.com> References: <20190328124733.25580-1-konstantin.ananyev@intel.com> Subject: [dpdk-dev] [PATCH v2] examples/ipsec-secgw: fix SPD no-match is misinterpreted X-BeenThere: dev@dpdk.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: DPDK patches and discussions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: dev-bounces@dpdk.org Sender: "dev" acl_classify() returns zero value when no matching rule was found. Currently ipsec-secgw treats it as a valid SPI value, though it has to discard such packets. Error could be easily observed by sending outbound unmatched packets, user will see something like that in the log: IPSEC: No cryptodev: core 7, cipher_algo 0, auth_algo 0, aead_algo 0 To fix it we need to treat packets with zero result from acl_classify() as invalid ones. Also we can change DISCARD and BYPASS values to simplify checks and save some extra space for valid SPI values. To summarize the approach: 1. have special SPI values for DISCARD and BYPASS. 2. store in SPD full SPI value. 3. after acl_classify(), first check SPI value for DISCARD and BYPASS, then convert it in SA index. 4. add check at initilisation time that for each SPD rule there is a corresponding SA entry (with the same SPI). Also marked few global variables as *static*. Fixes: 906257e965b7 ("examples/ipsec-secgw: support IPv6") Fixes: 2a5106af132b ("examples/ipsec-secgw: fix corner case for SPI value") Cc: stable@dpdk.org Signed-off-by: Konstantin Ananyev Acked-by: Fan Zhang Acked-by: Akhil Goyal --- examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c | 20 ++++++------ examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h | 14 ++++++--- examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++--- examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 5 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c index ffbd00b08..2e203393d 100644 --- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c +++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec-secgw.c @@ -438,11 +438,11 @@ inbound_sp_sa(struct sp_ctx *sp, struct sa_ctx *sa, struct traffic_type *ip, for (i = 0; i < ip->num; i++) { m = ip->pkts[i]; res = ip->res[i]; - if (res & BYPASS) { + if (res == BYPASS) { ip->pkts[j++] = m; continue; } - if (res & DISCARD) { + if (res == DISCARD) { rte_pktmbuf_free(m); continue; } @@ -453,9 +453,8 @@ inbound_sp_sa(struct sp_ctx *sp, struct sa_ctx *sa, struct traffic_type *ip, continue; } - sa_idx = ip->res[i] & PROTECT_MASK; - if (sa_idx >= IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES || - !inbound_sa_check(sa, m, sa_idx)) { + sa_idx = SPI2IDX(res); + if (!inbound_sa_check(sa, m, sa_idx)) { rte_pktmbuf_free(m); continue; } @@ -541,16 +540,15 @@ outbound_sp(struct sp_ctx *sp, struct traffic_type *ip, j = 0; for (i = 0; i < ip->num; i++) { m = ip->pkts[i]; - sa_idx = ip->res[i] & PROTECT_MASK; - if (ip->res[i] & DISCARD) + sa_idx = SPI2IDX(ip->res[i]); + if (ip->res[i] == DISCARD) rte_pktmbuf_free(m); - else if (ip->res[i] & BYPASS) + else if (ip->res[i] == BYPASS) ip->pkts[j++] = m; - else if (sa_idx < IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES) { + else { ipsec->res[ipsec->num] = sa_idx; ipsec->pkts[ipsec->num++] = m; - } else /* invalid SA idx */ - rte_pktmbuf_free(m); + } } ip->num = j; } diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h index 99f49d65f..589398f6f 100644 --- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h +++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/ipsec.h @@ -41,10 +41,8 @@ #define SPI2IDX(spi) (spi & (IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES - 1)) #define INVALID_SPI (0) -#define DISCARD (0x80000000) -#define BYPASS (0x40000000) -#define PROTECT_MASK (0x3fffffff) -#define PROTECT(sa_idx) (SPI2IDX(sa_idx) & PROTECT_MASK) /* SA idx 30 bits */ +#define DISCARD INVALID_SPI +#define BYPASS UINT32_MAX #define IPSEC_XFORM_MAX 2 @@ -289,6 +287,14 @@ sp4_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound); int sp6_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound); +/* + * Search through SA entries for given SPI. + * Returns first entry index if found(greater or equal then zero), + * or -ENOENT otherwise. + */ +int +sa_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound); + void sa_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id); diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c index a7298a30c..b850e9839 100644 --- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c +++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sa.c @@ -126,11 +126,11 @@ const struct supported_aead_algo aead_algos[] = { } }; -struct ipsec_sa sa_out[IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES]; -uint32_t nb_sa_out; +static struct ipsec_sa sa_out[IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES]; +static uint32_t nb_sa_out; -struct ipsec_sa sa_in[IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES]; -uint32_t nb_sa_in; +static struct ipsec_sa sa_in[IPSEC_SA_MAX_ENTRIES]; +static uint32_t nb_sa_in; static const struct supported_cipher_algo * find_match_cipher_algo(const char *cipher_keyword) @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ parse_sa_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens, *ri = *ri + 1; } -static inline void +static void print_one_sa_rule(const struct ipsec_sa *sa, int inbound) { uint32_t i; @@ -1116,6 +1116,31 @@ ipsec_satbl_init(struct sa_ctx *ctx, const struct ipsec_sa *ent, return rc; } +/* + * Walk through all SA rules to find an SA with given SPI + */ +int +sa_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound) +{ + uint32_t i, num; + const struct ipsec_sa *sar; + + if (inbound != 0) { + sar = sa_in; + num = nb_sa_in; + } else { + sar = sa_out; + num = nb_sa_out; + } + + for (i = 0; i != num; i++) { + if (sar[i].spi == spi) + return i; + } + + return -ENOENT; +} + void sa_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id) { diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c index d1dc64bad..ca9ee7f24 100644 --- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c +++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp4.c @@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ parse_sp4_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens, uint32_t *ri = NULL; /* rule index */ uint32_t ti = 0; /* token index */ + uint32_t tv; uint32_t esp_p = 0; uint32_t protect_p = 0; @@ -169,8 +170,12 @@ parse_sp4_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens, if (status->status < 0) return; - rule_ipv4->data.userdata = - PROTECT(atoi(tokens[ti])); + tv = atoi(tokens[ti]); + APP_CHECK(tv != DISCARD && tv != BYPASS, status, + "invalid SPI: %s", tokens[ti]); + if (status->status < 0) + return; + rule_ipv4->data.userdata = tv; protect_p = 1; continue; @@ -472,6 +477,36 @@ acl4_init(const char *name, int32_t socketid, const struct acl4_rules *rules, return ctx; } +/* + * check that for each rule it's SPI has a correspondent entry in SAD + */ +static int +check_spi_value(int inbound) +{ + uint32_t i, num, spi; + const struct acl4_rules *acr; + + if (inbound != 0) { + acr = acl4_rules_in; + num = nb_acl4_rules_in; + } else { + acr = acl4_rules_out; + num = nb_acl4_rules_out; + } + + for (i = 0; i != num; i++) { + spi = acr[i].data.userdata; + if (spi != DISCARD && spi != BYPASS && + sa_spi_present(spi, inbound) < 0) { + RTE_LOG(ERR, IPSEC, "SPI %u is not present in SAD\n", + spi); + return -ENOENT; + } + } + + return 0; +} + void sp4_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id) { @@ -488,6 +523,14 @@ sp4_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id) rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Outbound SP DB for socket %u already " "initialized\n", socket_id); + if (check_spi_value(1) < 0) + rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, + "Inbound IPv4 SP DB has unmatched in SAD SPIs\n"); + + if (check_spi_value(0) < 0) + rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, + "Outbound IPv4 SP DB has unmatched in SAD SPIs\n"); + if (nb_acl4_rules_in > 0) { name = "sp_ip4_in"; ctx->sp_ip4_in = (struct sp_ctx *)acl4_init(name, @@ -523,7 +566,7 @@ sp4_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound) } for (i = 0; i != num; i++) { - if (acr[i].data.userdata == PROTECT(spi)) + if (acr[i].data.userdata == spi) return i; } diff --git a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c index e67d85aaf..76be3d3e9 100644 --- a/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c +++ b/examples/ipsec-secgw/sp6.c @@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ parse_sp6_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens, uint32_t *ri = NULL; /* rule index */ uint32_t ti = 0; /* token index */ + uint32_t tv; uint32_t esp_p = 0; uint32_t protect_p = 0; @@ -202,8 +203,12 @@ parse_sp6_tokens(char **tokens, uint32_t n_tokens, if (status->status < 0) return; - rule_ipv6->data.userdata = - PROTECT(atoi(tokens[ti])); + tv = atoi(tokens[ti]); + APP_CHECK(tv != DISCARD && tv != BYPASS, status, + "invalid SPI: %s", tokens[ti]); + if (status->status < 0) + return; + rule_ipv6->data.userdata = tv; protect_p = 1; continue; @@ -586,6 +591,36 @@ acl6_init(const char *name, int32_t socketid, const struct acl6_rules *rules, return ctx; } +/* + * check that for each rule it's SPI has a correspondent entry in SAD + */ +static int +check_spi_value(int inbound) +{ + uint32_t i, num, spi; + const struct acl6_rules *acr; + + if (inbound != 0) { + acr = acl6_rules_in; + num = nb_acl6_rules_in; + } else { + acr = acl6_rules_out; + num = nb_acl6_rules_out; + } + + for (i = 0; i != num; i++) { + spi = acr[i].data.userdata; + if (spi != DISCARD && spi != BYPASS && + sa_spi_present(spi, inbound) < 0) { + RTE_LOG(ERR, IPSEC, "SPI %u is not present in SAD\n", + spi); + return -ENOENT; + } + } + + return 0; +} + void sp6_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id) { @@ -602,6 +637,14 @@ sp6_init(struct socket_ctx *ctx, int32_t socket_id) rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, "Outbound IPv6 SP DB for socket %u " "already initialized\n", socket_id); + if (check_spi_value(1) < 0) + rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, + "Inbound IPv6 SP DB has unmatched in SAD SPIs\n"); + + if (check_spi_value(0) < 0) + rte_exit(EXIT_FAILURE, + "Outbound IPv6 SP DB has unmatched in SAD SPIs\n"); + if (nb_acl6_rules_in > 0) { name = "sp_ip6_in"; ctx->sp_ip6_in = (struct sp_ctx *)acl6_init(name, @@ -637,7 +680,7 @@ sp6_spi_present(uint32_t spi, int inbound) } for (i = 0; i != num; i++) { - if (acr[i].data.userdata == PROTECT(spi)) + if (acr[i].data.userdata == spi) return i; }