fips_validation: fix auth verify
diff mbox series

Message ID 20191106105425.1061-1-roy.fan.zhang@intel.com
State Accepted, archived
Delegated to: akhil goyal
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Series
  • fips_validation: fix auth verify
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Context Check Description
ci/Intel-compilation success Compilation OK
ci/travis-robot success Travis build: passed
ci/iol-mellanox-Performance success Performance Testing PASS
ci/iol-compilation success Compile Testing PASS
ci/iol-intel-Performance success Performance Testing PASS
ci/checkpatch success coding style OK

Commit Message

Fan Zhang Nov. 6, 2019, 10:54 a.m. UTC
Fixes: f64adb6714e0 ("examples/fips_validation: support HMAC parsing")
Cc: marko.kovacevic@intel.com
Cc: stable@dpdk.org

This patch fixes the incorrect mbuf write and digest memory leak in
fips_validation authentication verify.

Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
---
 examples/fips_validation/main.c | 58 +++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

Comments

Akhil Goyal Nov. 18, 2019, 7:09 a.m. UTC | #1
Hi Marko,

Could you please ack this patch if no issues.

> 
> Fixes: f64adb6714e0 ("examples/fips_validation: support HMAC parsing")
> Cc: marko.kovacevic@intel.com
> Cc: stable@dpdk.org
> 
> This patch fixes the incorrect mbuf write and digest memory leak in
> fips_validation authentication verify.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Fan Zhang <roy.fan.zhang@intel.com>
> ---

Regards,
Akhil
Kovacevic, Marko Nov. 18, 2019, 4:43 p.m. UTC | #2
Acked-by: Marko Kovacevic <marko.kovacevic@intel.com>
Akhil Goyal Nov. 19, 2019, 7:53 a.m. UTC | #3
> Acked-by: Marko Kovacevic <marko.kovacevic@intel.com>

Applied to dpdk-next-crypto

Thanks.

Patch
diff mbox series

diff --git a/examples/fips_validation/main.c b/examples/fips_validation/main.c
index f8694ef96..9a2c8da61 100644
--- a/examples/fips_validation/main.c
+++ b/examples/fips_validation/main.c
@@ -512,6 +512,7 @@  static int
 prepare_auth_op(void)
 {
 	struct rte_crypto_sym_op *sym = env.op->sym;
+	uint8_t *pt;
 
 	__rte_crypto_op_reset(env.op, RTE_CRYPTO_OP_TYPE_SYMMETRIC);
 	rte_pktmbuf_reset(env.mbuf);
@@ -519,52 +520,25 @@  prepare_auth_op(void)
 	sym->m_src = env.mbuf;
 	sym->auth.data.offset = 0;
 
-	if (info.op == FIPS_TEST_ENC_AUTH_GEN) {
-		uint8_t *pt;
-
-		if (vec.pt.len > RTE_MBUF_MAX_NB_SEGS) {
-			RTE_LOG(ERR, USER1, "PT len %u\n", vec.pt.len);
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
-
-		pt = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(env.mbuf, vec.pt.len +
-				vec.cipher_auth.digest.len);
-
-		if (!pt) {
-			RTE_LOG(ERR, USER1, "Error %i: MBUF too small\n",
-					-ENOMEM);
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		}
-
-		memcpy(pt, vec.pt.val, vec.pt.len);
-		sym->auth.data.length = vec.pt.len;
-		sym->auth.digest.data = pt + vec.pt.len;
-		sym->auth.digest.phys_addr = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys_offset(
-				env.mbuf, vec.pt.len);
-
-	} else {
-		uint8_t *ct;
+	pt = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(env.mbuf, vec.pt.len +
+			vec.cipher_auth.digest.len);
 
-		if (vec.ct.len > RTE_MBUF_MAX_NB_SEGS) {
-			RTE_LOG(ERR, USER1, "CT len %u\n", vec.ct.len);
-			return -EPERM;
-		}
+	if (!pt) {
+		RTE_LOG(ERR, USER1, "Error %i: MBUF too small\n",
+				-ENOMEM);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
-		ct = (uint8_t *)rte_pktmbuf_append(env.mbuf,
-				vec.ct.len + vec.cipher_auth.digest.len);
+	sym->auth.data.length = vec.pt.len;
+	sym->auth.digest.data = pt + vec.pt.len;
+	sym->auth.digest.phys_addr = rte_pktmbuf_mtophys_offset(
+			env.mbuf, vec.pt.len);
 
-		if (!ct) {
-			RTE_LOG(ERR, USER1, "Error %i: MBUF too small\n",
-					-ENOMEM);
-			return -ENOMEM;
-		}
+	memcpy(pt, vec.pt.val, vec.pt.len);
 
-		memcpy(ct, vec.ct.val, vec.ct.len);
-		sym->auth.data.length = vec.ct.len;
-		sym->auth.digest.data = vec.cipher_auth.digest.val;
-		sym->auth.digest.phys_addr = rte_malloc_virt2iova(
-				sym->auth.digest.data);
-	}
+	if (info.op == FIPS_TEST_DEC_AUTH_VERIF)
+		memcpy(pt + vec.pt.len, vec.cipher_auth.digest.val,
+				vec.cipher_auth.digest.len);
 
 	rte_crypto_op_attach_sym_session(env.op, env.sess);