[v3,1/5] crypto/openssl: fix GCM and CCM thread unsafe ctxs

Message ID 20240606102043.2926695-2-jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com (mailing list archive)
State Superseded
Delegated to: akhil goyal
Headers
Series OpenSSL PMD Optimisations |

Checks

Context Check Description
ci/checkpatch success coding style OK

Commit Message

Jack Bond-Preston June 6, 2024, 10:20 a.m. UTC
  Commit 67ab783b5d70 ("crypto/openssl: use local copy for session
contexts") introduced a fix for concurrency bugs which could occur when
using one OpenSSL PMD session across multiple cores simultaneously. The
solution was to clone the EVP contexts per-buffer to avoid them being
used concurrently.

However, part of commit 75adf1eae44f ("crypto/openssl: update HMAC
routine with 3.0 EVP API") reverted this fix, only for combined ops
(AES-GCM and AES-CCM).

Fix the concurrency issue by cloning EVP contexts per-buffer. An extra
workaround is required for OpenSSL versions which are >= 3.0.0, and
<= 3.2.0. This is because, prior to OpenSSL 3.2.0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy()
is not implemented for AES-GCM or AES-CCM. When using these OpenSSL
versions, create and initialise the context from scratch, per-buffer.

Throughput performance uplift measurements for AES-GCM-128 encrypt on
Ampere Altra Max platform:
1 worker lcore
|   buffer sz (B) |   prev (Gbps) |   optimised (Gbps) |   uplift |
|-----------------+---------------+--------------------+----------|
|              64 |          2.60 |               1.31 |   -49.5% |
|             256 |          7.69 |               4.45 |   -42.1% |
|            1024 |         15.33 |              11.30 |   -26.3% |
|            2048 |         18.74 |              15.37 |   -18.0% |
|            4096 |         21.11 |              18.80 |   -10.9% |

8 worker lcores
|   buffer sz (B) |   prev (Gbps) |   optimised (Gbps) |   uplift |
|-----------------+---------------+--------------------+----------|
|              64 |         19.94 |               2.83 |   -85.8% |
|             256 |         58.84 |              11.00 |   -81.3% |
|            1024 |        119.71 |              42.46 |   -64.5% |
|            2048 |        147.69 |              80.91 |   -45.2% |
|            4096 |        167.39 |             121.25 |   -27.6% |

Fixes: 75adf1eae44f ("crypto/openssl: update HMAC routine with 3.0 EVP API")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org
Signed-off-by: Jack Bond-Preston <jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Wathsala Vithanage <wathsala.vithanage@arm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c | 84 ++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
  

Comments

Akhil Goyal June 6, 2024, 10:44 a.m. UTC | #1
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [PATCH v3 1/5] crypto/openssl: fix GCM and CCM thread
> unsafe ctxs
> 
> Commit 67ab783b5d70 ("crypto/openssl: use local copy for session
> contexts") introduced a fix for concurrency bugs which could occur when
> using one OpenSSL PMD session across multiple cores simultaneously. The
> solution was to clone the EVP contexts per-buffer to avoid them being
> used concurrently.
> 
> However, part of commit 75adf1eae44f ("crypto/openssl: update HMAC
> routine with 3.0 EVP API") reverted this fix, only for combined ops
> (AES-GCM and AES-CCM).
> 
> Fix the concurrency issue by cloning EVP contexts per-buffer. An extra
> workaround is required for OpenSSL versions which are >= 3.0.0, and
> <= 3.2.0. This is because, prior to OpenSSL 3.2.0, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy()
> is not implemented for AES-GCM or AES-CCM. When using these OpenSSL
> versions, create and initialise the context from scratch, per-buffer.
> 
> Throughput performance uplift measurements for AES-GCM-128 encrypt on
> Ampere Altra Max platform:
> 1 worker lcore
> |   buffer sz (B) |   prev (Gbps) |   optimised (Gbps) |   uplift |
> |-----------------+---------------+--------------------+----------|
> |              64 |          2.60 |               1.31 |   -49.5% |
> |             256 |          7.69 |               4.45 |   -42.1% |
> |            1024 |         15.33 |              11.30 |   -26.3% |
> |            2048 |         18.74 |              15.37 |   -18.0% |
> |            4096 |         21.11 |              18.80 |   -10.9% |
> 
> 8 worker lcores
> |   buffer sz (B) |   prev (Gbps) |   optimised (Gbps) |   uplift |
> |-----------------+---------------+--------------------+----------|
> |              64 |         19.94 |               2.83 |   -85.8% |
> |             256 |         58.84 |              11.00 |   -81.3% |
> |            1024 |        119.71 |              42.46 |   -64.5% |
> |            2048 |        147.69 |              80.91 |   -45.2% |
> |            4096 |        167.39 |             121.25 |   -27.6% |
> 
> Fixes: 75adf1eae44f ("crypto/openssl: update HMAC routine with 3.0 EVP API")
> Cc: stable@dpdk.org
> Signed-off-by: Jack Bond-Preston <jack.bond-preston@foss.arm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Wathsala Vithanage <wathsala.vithanage@arm.com>
Hi Kai,

Please review these optimizations.

Regards,
Akhil
  

Patch

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
index e8cb09defc..3f7f4d8c37 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/openssl/rte_openssl_pmd.c
@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@  get_aead_algo(enum rte_crypto_aead_algorithm sess_algo, size_t keylen,
 static int
 openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
 		enum rte_crypto_aead_algorithm algo,
-		uint8_t tag_len, const uint8_t *key)
+		uint8_t tag_len, const uint8_t *key,
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX **ctx)
 {
 	int iv_type = 0;
 	unsigned int do_ccm;
@@ -378,7 +379,7 @@  openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
 	}
 
 	sess->cipher.mode = OPENSSL_CIPHER_LIB;
-	sess->cipher.ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	*ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 
 	if (get_aead_algo(algo, sess->cipher.key.length,
 			&sess->cipher.evp_algo) != 0)
@@ -388,19 +389,19 @@  openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
 
 	sess->chain_order = OPENSSL_CHAIN_COMBINED;
 
-	if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(sess->cipher.ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo,
+	if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(*ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo,
 			NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(sess->cipher.ctx, iv_type, sess->iv.length,
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(*ctx, iv_type, sess->iv.length,
 			NULL) <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (do_ccm)
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(sess->cipher.ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(*ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
 				tag_len, NULL);
 
-	if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(sess->cipher.ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0)
+	if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(*ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -410,7 +411,8 @@  openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
 static int
 openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
 		enum rte_crypto_aead_algorithm algo,
-		uint8_t tag_len, const uint8_t *key)
+		uint8_t tag_len, const uint8_t *key,
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX **ctx)
 {
 	int iv_type = 0;
 	unsigned int do_ccm = 0;
@@ -437,7 +439,7 @@  openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
 	}
 
 	sess->cipher.mode = OPENSSL_CIPHER_LIB;
-	sess->cipher.ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	*ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
 
 	if (get_aead_algo(algo, sess->cipher.key.length,
 			&sess->cipher.evp_algo) != 0)
@@ -447,24 +449,54 @@  openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(struct openssl_session *sess,
 
 	sess->chain_order = OPENSSL_CHAIN_COMBINED;
 
-	if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(sess->cipher.ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo,
+	if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(*ctx, sess->cipher.evp_algo,
 			NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(sess->cipher.ctx, iv_type,
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(*ctx, iv_type,
 			sess->iv.length, NULL) <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (do_ccm)
-		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(sess->cipher.ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(*ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
 				tag_len, NULL);
 
-	if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(sess->cipher.ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0)
+	if (EVP_DecryptInit_ex(*ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL) <= 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int openssl_aesni_ctx_clone(EVP_CIPHER_CTX **dest,
+		struct openssl_session *sess)
+{
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x30200000L)
+	*dest = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_dup(sess->ctx);
+	return 0;
+#elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER > 0x30000000L)
+	/* OpenSSL versions 3.0.0 <= V < 3.2.0 have no dupctx() implementation
+	 * for AES-GCM and AES-CCM. In this case, we have to create new empty
+	 * contexts and initialise, as we did the original context.
+	 */
+	if (sess->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC)
+		sess->aead_algo = RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM;
+
+	if (sess->cipher.direction == RTE_CRYPTO_CIPHER_OP_ENCRYPT)
+		return openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(sess, sess->aead_algo,
+				sess->auth.digest_length, sess->cipher.key.data,
+				dest);
+	else
+		return openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(sess, sess->aead_algo,
+				sess->auth.digest_length, sess->cipher.key.data,
+				dest);
+#else
+	*dest = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(*dest, sess->cipher.ctx) != 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
 /** Set session cipher parameters */
 static int
 openssl_set_session_cipher_parameters(struct openssl_session *sess,
@@ -623,12 +655,14 @@  openssl_set_session_auth_parameters(struct openssl_session *sess,
 			return openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(sess,
 						RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM,
 						xform->auth.digest_length,
-						xform->auth.key.data);
+						xform->auth.key.data,
+						&sess->cipher.ctx);
 		else
 			return openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(sess,
 						RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_AES_GCM,
 						xform->auth.digest_length,
-						xform->auth.key.data);
+						xform->auth.key.data,
+						&sess->cipher.ctx);
 		break;
 
 	case RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_MD5:
@@ -770,10 +804,12 @@  openssl_set_session_aead_parameters(struct openssl_session *sess,
 	/* Select cipher direction */
 	if (xform->aead.op == RTE_CRYPTO_AEAD_OP_ENCRYPT)
 		return openssl_set_sess_aead_enc_param(sess, xform->aead.algo,
-				xform->aead.digest_length, xform->aead.key.data);
+				xform->aead.digest_length, xform->aead.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.ctx);
 	else
 		return openssl_set_sess_aead_dec_param(sess, xform->aead.algo,
-				xform->aead.digest_length, xform->aead.key.data);
+				xform->aead.digest_length, xform->aead.key.data,
+				&sess->cipher.ctx);
 }
 
 /** Parse crypto xform chain and set private session parameters */
@@ -1590,6 +1626,12 @@  process_openssl_combined_op
 		return;
 	}
 
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+	if (openssl_aesni_ctx_clone(&ctx, sess) != 0) {
+		op->status = RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR;
+		return;
+	}
+
 	iv = rte_crypto_op_ctod_offset(op, uint8_t *,
 			sess->iv.offset);
 	if (sess->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC) {
@@ -1623,12 +1665,12 @@  process_openssl_combined_op
 			status = process_openssl_auth_encryption_gcm(
 					mbuf_src, offset, srclen,
 					aad, aadlen, iv,
-					dst, tag, sess->cipher.ctx);
+					dst, tag, ctx);
 		else
 			status = process_openssl_auth_encryption_ccm(
 					mbuf_src, offset, srclen,
 					aad, aadlen, iv,
-					dst, tag, taglen, sess->cipher.ctx);
+					dst, tag, taglen, ctx);
 
 	} else {
 		if (sess->auth.algo == RTE_CRYPTO_AUTH_AES_GMAC ||
@@ -1636,14 +1678,16 @@  process_openssl_combined_op
 			status = process_openssl_auth_decryption_gcm(
 					mbuf_src, offset, srclen,
 					aad, aadlen, iv,
-					dst, tag, sess->cipher.ctx);
+					dst, tag, ctx);
 		else
 			status = process_openssl_auth_decryption_ccm(
 					mbuf_src, offset, srclen,
 					aad, aadlen, iv,
-					dst, tag, taglen, sess->cipher.ctx);
+					dst, tag, taglen, ctx);
 	}
 
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+
 	if (status != 0) {
 		if (status == (-EFAULT) &&
 				sess->auth.operation ==